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BIAS AND THE INFORMED OBSERVER: A CALL
FOR A RETURN TO GOUGH
ABIMBOLA A. OLOWOFOYEKU*
INTRODUCTION
“Under the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite
apart from the judge’s personal conduct, there are ascertainable
facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect
even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at
stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society
must inspire in the public …. Accordingly, any judge in respect of
whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality
must withdraw.”1
THE decision of the House of Lords in the conjoined appeals, R. v.
Abdroikov, R. v. Green and R. v. Wilkinson2 (hereafter referred to as
Abdroikov) brings to the fore again the question of the standards of
adjudication and review in cases of alleged apparent bias. The appeals
raise difficult questions, not least of which is the role of the “impartial
observer” in cases wherein a decision is being challenged on appeal or
judicial review on grounds of apparent bias.
The appeals involved police officers and a Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) solicitor serving on juries. Abdroikov had been convicted
by a jury whose foreman was a serving police officer – a fact unknown
to the court until the jury had retired to consider its verdict. Green had
been convicted by a jury that included a police officer serving in the
same borough as the police officer who had conducted a stop and
search on Green, and who had been a prosecution witness at Green’s
trial. The two officers had also once served in the same police station at
the same time, although they did not know each other. Williamson had
been convicted by a jury whose foreman was a solicitor working for the
CPS. The trial judge had overruled the objections of defence counsel to
the presence of this solicitor on the jury. The Court of Appeal dismissed
Abdroikov’s, Green’s and Williamson’s appeals against their convic-
tions, on the ground that a fair-minded and informed observer would
not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias from the two
* Professor of Law and Head of Brunel Law School. I am grateful to Professor Dawn Oliver of UCL
for her comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 The European Court of Human Rights in Hauschildt v. Denmark (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 266 at [48].
2 [2007] UKHL 37; [2008] 1 All E.R. 315.
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police officers and the CPS solicitor who had served on the relevant
juries. In the House of Lords,3 Abdroikov’s appeal was dismissed
unanimously. Green’s and Williamson’s appeals were allowed by a
majority (Lords Rodger and Carswell dissenting).
This all looks straightforward enough. So what is the problem?
Lord Mance neatly summed it up. Having had the benefit of reading
drafts of the opinions of both the majority and dissenting speeches
before writing his own speech, he noted that there was a division of
opinion with regard to two of the appeals (Green and Williamson), and
that the difference turned “largely on different perceptions of the view
that would be taken by a fair-minded and informed observer, after
considering the facts”, of the question whether there was a reasonable
possibility of bias.4
It will be argued in this article that this (the Lords deciding the
issues based on their speculations as to the mind of a fictitious third
party) is unsatisfactory. Fictional characters are created by the courts
in situations wherein they wish to retain a wide measure of discretion
in reaching the “right” decision in individual cases. The fictitious
“reasonable man” or reasonable person that permeates the discourses
in negligence cases is one such example. More pertinent to the current
discussion is the “fair-minded and informed observer” that now haunts
the discourses on bias. Lord Mance admitted in Abdroikov that this
person is “in large measure the construct of the court”.5 The kind of use
of fictional characters seen in Abdroikov and similar cases on bias often
leads courts to what is effectively a case-by-case approach to complex
questions. While this is understandable as a pragmatic approach, the
fiction, when taken too far, does little to provide reliable guidance to
stakeholders in the judicial process. It is not right for any decision of
the nation’s apex court (or, indeed, of any court) to be predicated, not
on some point of principle (which can be unpacked), but entirely on
whatever judges may imagine that some fictional characters would
think.6 The normal processes for appeal or judicial review are unsuited
for this kind of inquiry. There must be another way – and, that way, it
will be argued, is a partial return to Lord Goff of Chieveley’s statement
of principle in R. v. Gough,7 dispense with the informed observer and
restore the perspective of the reviewing court. This would be but a
3 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord
Carswell, and Lord Mance.
4 At [80].
5 At [81].
6 Two other problems arise in constructing the informed observer. First, the observer’s personality
and character, and, secondly, the knowledge and understanding required before the observer is
deemed to be “informed”.
7 [1993] A.C. 646 at 667–670. According to Lord Goff (at 670) it is “unnecessary, in formulating the
appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a
reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man.”
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slight shift – but it would be one that would engage a completely dif-
ferent mindset and approach to the resolution of bias cases. But first,
we must go to the beginning.
THE RULE AGAINST BIAS
Under Article 6 of the ECHR and under common law, litigants have
the right to have their cases heard and decided by an impartial and
unbiased tribunal. Although “in modern practice … no party has the
right to decide by whom his case will be tried”, and “it is not open to a
party, by the mere making of an objection, to exclude from his case any
judge whose participation is not to his liking”, a judge who finds a
“sound objection” to his participation in a case is under a duty “to
recuse himself at once”.8 Subject to the issue of disqualification,9 it is
similarly not open to judges exclude themselves from cases that are not
to their liking. This is the so-called “duty to sit”.10 With respect to the
issue of disqualification, judicial officers are disqualified from sitting in
cases in which they have an interest11 or in which their impartiality is
reasonably questionable. This principle, otherwise known as the “rule
against bias”, is one of the common law’s instruments for implement-
ing the right to a fair hearing before an independent, impartial and
unbiased tribunal. The starting point is a presumption of judicial im-
partiality.12 Disqualification is trigged by either actual bias, or by ap-
prehended, apparent or objective bias. The question with respect to the
latter is whether there is a “real possibility” that the “judicial officer”
concerned is or will be biased.13 In this respect, the cases have not
sought to draw a distinction between judges and jurors, and the term
“judicial officer” refers to both. Many of the leading cases (including
Gough) indeed involve jurors, and in this article, I use the term “judges”
and “judicial officers” to include jurors, as contextually appropriate.
8 The Lord Justice-Clerk in Robbie The Pict v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2002] ScotHC 333, at [16].
9 See for example, Re JRL; Ex parte C.J.L [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 C.L.R. 342 at 352; Livesey v.
New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 C.L.R. 288 at 293.
10 Lord Justice-Clerk in Robbie The Pict v. Her Majesty’s Advocate (above). Also Locabail (UK) Ltd
v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] Q.B. 451 at 480; Bienstein v. Bienstein [2003] HCA 7 at [35–36]
(HC, Australia), SACCAWU v. Irvin & Johnson, 2000 (3) SA 705 at [13] (Const. Ct., SA).
11 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 H.L.C. 759; Sellar v. Highland Railway Co,
1919 SC (HL) 19; R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No
2) [2000] 1 A.C. 119; Meerabux v. AG of Belize [2005] UKPC 12.
12 Hauschildt v. Denmark (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 266 at [47] (ECt.HR); Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2007) 44
E.H.R.R. 27, [2005] ECHR 873 (ECt.HR); US v. Morgan, 313 US 409 at 421 (SC, 1941);
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2003] 2 SCR 259, 2003 SCC 45 at [59] (SC, Canada); President
of the Republic of South Africa and others v. South African Rugby Football Union and others [1999]
7 B. Const. L.R. 725, 1999 (4) SA 147 at [40] (Const. Ct., South Africa); Jaipal v. The State (18 Feb
2005), Case CCT 12/04 at [42] (Const. Ct., South Africa).
13 Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 A.C. 357; In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001]
1 W.L.R. 700; Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] UKHL 35; Davidson v. Scottish Ministers [2004]
UKHL 34.
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The principle of apparent bias is common in the Anglo-American
legal traditions, and, in this article, I will be referring to cases from a
number of other jurisdictions. While decisions from these jurisdictions
are only persuasive in England, these cases are highly relevant because
the applicable principles are similar, albeit with varying formulations.
For example, in parts of the Commonwealth, the principle of apparent
bias refers to a “reasonable apprehension” or “reasonable suspicion”
of bias,14 while it refers in US Federal law to cases in which a judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.15 The aim in all cases is to
ensure that justice is “seen” to be done.16 This principle, “of funda-
mental importance”, is widespread,17 enshrined in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights,18 and is all about appearances.
According to Scalia J. of the US Supreme Court, “what matters is not
the reality of bias or prejudice, but its appearance”.19 Frankfurter J. of
the same court said that “justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice”.20 In the UK, Lord Nolan said in the Pinochet21 case that, in any
case in which the impartiality of a judge is in question the appearance
of the matter is just as important as the reality. With regard to the
question of whose benefit the “appearances” are for, Lord Steyn in
Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd identified this as the “public”.22 This
concern about the “the objective appearance of impartiality”23 is a
“manifestation of a broader preoccupation about the image of jus-
tice”.24 And this is where the informed observer comes in.
14 See e.g. R. v. Webb [1994] HCA 30, (1994) 181 C.L.R. 41 (HC, Australia); Cook v. Patterson [1972]
N.Z.L.R. 861 (CA, New Zealand), EH Cochrane Ltd v. Ministry of Transport [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R.
146 (CA, New Zealand), Auckland Casino Ltd. v. Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 142
(CA, New Zealand); Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board (1976) 68 D.L.R.
(3d) 716 (SC, Canada); R. v. S (RD) (1997) 151 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (SC, Canada); SACCAWU v.
Irvin & Johnson [2000] 8 B. Const. LR 886, 2000 (3) SA 705 (Const. Ct., South Africa); President of
the Republic of South Africa and others v. South African Rugby Football Union and others [1999] 7
B. Const. L.R. 725, 1999 (4) SA. 147 (Const. Ct., South Africa).
15 28 U.S.C. · 455(a).
16 Lord Hewart C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259. See also Millar
v Dickson [2002] SC 30 at [63] (PC).
17 See for example, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak 343 US 451 at 476 (SC, 1952); In re United
States 666 F.2d. 690 at 694 (1st Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48; Ebner v. Official
Trustee in Bankruptcy [1999] FCA 110, [2000] HCA 63 (HC, Australia); Erris Promotions v. Inland
Revenue [2003] NZCA 163 at [24] (CA, New Zealand).
18 See e.g. Delcourt v. Belgium (1970) 1 E.H.R.R. 355 at [31]; De Cubber v. Belgium (1984) 7
E.H.R.R. 236 at [26]; Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 27, [2005] ECHR 873.
19 Liteky v. US, 127 L. Ed.2d. 474 at 486, per Scalia J. (SC, 1994). See also the ECt.HR in Hauschildt
v. Denmark (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 266 at para. 48 (referring to De Cubber v. Belgium).
20 Offutt v. United States 99 L. Ed. 11 at 16 (SC, 1954).
21 R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All
E.R. 577, 592.
22 “Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key.” [2003] UKHL 35 at [14].
23 The Lord Justice-Clerk in Robbie The Pict v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2002] ScotHC 333, [2003]
S.C.C.R. 99 at [24].
24 See the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, 2003
SCC 45 at [66].
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ENTER THE OBSERVER
In a bid to maintain visible objectivity in the inquiry into apparent bias,
the inquiry is conducted from the viewpoint of an independent third
party, rather than that of the judicial officer whose impartiality is being
questioned. According to the Lord Justice-Clerk in Davidson v. Scottish
Ministers:
[T]his being a question of public confidence in the administration
of justice, we are concerned with the appearance of things. The
question has to be decided from the standpoint of the onlooker
rather than that of the judge [whose impartiality is in question].25
In Metropolitan Properties Ltd v. Lannon26 Lord Denning M.R. said
that justice is rooted in confidence, and that confidence is destroyed
when right-minded people go away thinking that the judge was biased.
The “onlooker” or “right-minded” person referred to in these state-
ments has since crystallised into a reasonable, impartial, well-informed,
fair-minded, detached, objective, observer. This is how Kennedy J. of
the US Supreme Court put it in Liteky v. US:
Disqualification is required if an objective observer would enter-
tain reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality. If a
judge’s attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to
conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge
must be disqualified.27
The situation in which a judicial officer is facing a request to recuse
himself/herself is amenable to this process. Clearly, such a person is
obliged to consider how his/her continuing to hear the case would look
to another person. That other person may be a notional informed ob-
server (if constructed sensibly) or an appeal/review court that may be
asked to rule on the propriety of a decision to not stand down.
Recourse to some sort of fictional third party is inevitable when the
objection is taken during the original trial/hearing. In such cases,
doubts should be resolved in favour of recusal.28
But this article focuses rather on the situations in which the matter
is being considered on appeal or judicial review. While the judges of
appeal and review courts are no doubt right-minded, informed,
reasonable, etc., they are apparently not the kind of “onlooker” that is
being envisaged when the informed observer is invoked at the appel-
late/review stage. Thus the question is “not based purely upon the as-
sessment by some judges of the capacity or performance of their
25 [2002] ScotCS 256 at [33] (affd. [2004] UKHL 34).
26 [1969] 1 Q.B. 577 at 599.
27 127 L.Ed.2d. 474 at 497.
28 See Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] Q.B. 451 at 480; Davidson v. Scottish
Ministers [2002] ScotCS 256 at [16].
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colleagues”.29 Rather, the “onlooker” has been described as “other
persons”, “the public”30 or, as a bystander taken as representative of
the community.31 So the fabled informed observer is a person outwith
the judiciary and even the legal profession32 – i.e., an ordinary member
of the public33 – to all intents and purposes, an invisible, ever-present
lay member of the review court. And herein, it will be argued, lies the
problem.
This outcome of apparently sidelining reasonable, impartial, re-
viewing judges in favour of reasonable, impartial, ordinary lay mem-
bers of the public would be fine enough if the legal construct developed
to support it were realistic. However, the combined wisdom of global
common law jurisprudence on the “informed observer” produces an
extraordinary and wholly unrealistic creature – howbeit, one that may
be deemed a logical necessity in this context, given that this invisible lay
member of the reviewing panel has an absolute veto (in that his or her
judgement in the matter is taken to be determinative).34
The discussion that follows on the attributes of the informed ob-
server may appear laboured. However, it is necessary to examine the
matter at some depth because therein lies the main source of the diffi-
culty being addressed in this article.
THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE INFORMED OBSERVER
The informed observer is a paragon of balance, virtue and wisdom,35 is
informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances,36 and must be
taken to have sought to be informed on at least the most basic con-
siderations relevant to arriving at a conclusion founded on a fair under-
standing of all the relevant circumstances.37 While he or she cannot be
attributed with a detailed knowledge of the law,38 at least, not a level of
knowledge of the law and an awareness of the judicial process that
ordinary experience suggests not to be the case,39 he or she is also not “a
person wholly uninformed and uninstructed about the law in general or
29 Gleeson C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA
at [12].
30 Stevens J. in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 US 847 at 863; Livesey v. New
South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 C.L.R. 288 at 293.
31 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [42].
32 “Such a person is not a lawyer” – Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [53].
33 Described as a “lay observer” by Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ. in Vakauta v. Kelly [1989]
HCA 44.
34 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [48].
35 See the general discussion and exhaustive list by Kirby J. of the High Court of Australia in Johnson
v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48.
36 Rehnquist C.J. in Microsoft Corp v. US, 147 L. Ed. 2d. at 1049.
37 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53].
38 Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [13].
39 Toohey J. in Vakauta v. Kelly [1989] HCA 44, at para 10 of his judgment.
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the issue to be decided”,40 but rather must be taken to have a reasonable
working grasp of how things are usually done.41
He or she cannot be attributed with highly specialised knowledge,42
with a knowledge of all that was eventually known to the court,43 or
with knowledge of the character or ability of a particular judge.44 This
person is less inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental dis-
cipline than the judiciary itself will be,45 and should not be attributed
“with a conviction that judges, or adjudicators as a class have a special
capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood by the appearance of wit-
nesses or the presentation of their oral evidence”.46 Nevertheless, he or
she will be aware of the strong professional pressures on adjudicators
(reinforced by the facilities of appeal and review) to uphold traditions
of integrity and impartiality.47 He or she must also now be taken to
have, at least in a very general way, some knowledge of the fact that an
adjudicator may properly adopt reasonable efforts to confine pro-
ceedings within appropriate limits and to ensure that time is not was-
ted.48 He or she would be taken to know commonplace things, such as
the fact that adjudicators sometimes say, or do, things that they might
later wish they had not said or done, without necessarily disqualifying
themselves from continuing to exercise their powers.49
The informed observer is reasonable,50 right-minded,51 thoughtful,52
not necessarily a man nor necessarily of European ethnicity or other
majority traits,53 neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or sus-
picious,54 not unduly compliant or naı¨ve55, not entitled to make snap
judgments,56 and would not reach a hasty conclusion based on the ap-
pearance evoked by an isolated episode of temper or remarks to the
parties or their representatives, which was taken out of context.57 He or
40 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53].
41 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Bolkiah & Ors v. The State of Brunei Darussalam & Anor (Brunei
Darussalam) [2007] UKPC 62, at [16].
42 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [49].
43 Ibid.
44 Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [13].
45 In re Mason, 916 F.2d. 384 at 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
46 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [57].
47 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53].
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [12]; Rehnquist C.J. in Microsoft Corp v. US, 147 L. Ed. 2d.
at 1049; SACCAWU v. Irvin & Johnson 2000 (3) SA 705 at [15]; President of the Republic of South
Africa and others v. South African Rugby Football Union and Others, 1999 (4) SA 147 at [45].
51 Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Ltd v. Lannon, above; Committee for Justice
and Liberty v. National Energy Board [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394; R. v. S (RD) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at
505, 507.
52 Jaipal v. State [2004] ZASCA 45 at [12] (Supreme Court of Appeals, South Africa).
53 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [52].
54 Johnson v. Johnson, above.
55 Lord Mance in Abdroikov, at [81].
56 Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [14].
57 Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53].
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she does not have a very sensitive or scrupulous conscience,58 can be
expected to be aware of the legal traditions and culture,59 but may not
be wholly uncritical of this culture,60 and would adopt a balanced ap-
proach.61
If one were to attempt to describe the attributes of the Archangel
Michael, one could not do much better than the above. This is just
another way of saying that this informed observer can only be a spirit
and cannot possibly exist in the world of human beings. However, this
phantom is superimposed on the law – the relevant legal question
being whether this informed observer would or might, in the light of
the circumstances, reasonably question the impartiality of the judicial
officer – i.e., whether he or she would conclude that there was “a real
possibility of bias”62 or “a reasonable possibility of bias”63 or whether
he or she “might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not
bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the
question the judge is required to decide”.64 These formulations all mean
the same thing, reflecting the principle applicable across the Common-
wealth, and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights.65
The apprehensions of bias on the part of the informed observer
must of course be reasonable,66 a matter to be considered in the
context of ordinary judicial practice,67 apparently, by the court itself.68
The reasonableness requirement means, among other things, that any
such apprehension must not be fantastic or fanciful.69 Finally, any
58 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [53]; De Grandpre´ J. of the Supreme Court of
Canada (dissenting) in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R.
369 at 395 (approved in Valente v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, and Wewaykum Indian Band v.
Canada [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, 2003 SCC 45).
59 Lord Woolf C.J. in Taylor v. Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90 at [61].
60 Lord Steyn in Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] UKHL 35 at [22].
61 See Lord Steyn in Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd, at [14]; Lord Mance in Abdroikov, at [81].
62 See Lord Bingham in Abdroikov at [1]; Baroness Hale at [45].
63 See Lord Mance in Abdroikov at [80].
64 See Gleeson C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA
at [11]; See also Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 C.L.R. 288 at 293–294;
Ebner v. Official Trustee [2000] HCA 63 at [6]; Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v. Creasy [2002] HCA 51 at
[68]; R. v. Mr Justice R.S. Watson, a Judge of the Family Court of Australia, Ex parte Armstrong
(1976) 9 A.L.R. 551 at 564–565; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 at [28];
Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [11]; Bienstein v. Bienstein [2003] HCA 7 at [31]; Hauschildt v.
Denmark (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 266 at [48]; Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., Stevens J.
(at 860); Rehnquist C.J. (dissenting) (at 871); the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Erris
Promotions & Anor v. Inland Revenue ([2003] NZCA 163 at [32]); the Supreme Court of Ireland in
Orange Ltd v. Director of Telecoms (No. 2) [2004] 4 I.R. 159 at 186.
65 Lord Steyn in Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd at [14].
66 R. v. Webb, above; Johnson v. Johnson, at [11–13]; SACCAWU v. Irvin & Johnson 2000 (3) SA 705,
para 15, referring to President of the Republic of South Africa and others v. South African Rugby
Football Union and Others, 1999 (4) SA 147, para. 45. This was described by the Court in State v.
Basson as “the reasonable apprehension of the reasonable person” (2004), CCT 30/03, para. 53.
67 Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [13].
68 See for example, Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA at [16] and [18].
69 Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v. National Australia Bank Limited & 8 Ors [2004] NSWSC 270 at [18]
(SC, NSW).
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apprehension of bias must have an objective basis70 – or, put slightly
differently, it must be “objectively justified”.71 This means that there
must be some demonstrable and rational basis for what the informed
observer suspects.72
Apart from these statements, there is little guidance on what is
“reasonable”, or on why it should be supposed that there is any possi-
bility that the fantastic creature described above could ever have an
apprehension or suspicion that is not reasonable. This in itself indicates
that the fiction, although long standing, is not well thought through,
and that the courts are struggling for a convincing way to bring the
matter onto an objective (from the perspective of their own decision-
making processes) basis.
In the end, despite the pitch on objectivity and the view that the
apprehensions of bias must have an objective basis, it is the opinion of
the reviewing court on this issue that matters. While lawyers and judges
might pretend to know what “reasonable” means objectively, it is, in
fact, a value-laden term, and, in many cases, judges appear to make
it up as they go along. It is trite that the profession’s (that is to say,
lawyers’ and judges’) perceptions of what is reasonable are not
necessarily consistent with those of the ordinary members of the public.
The judicial construct of the informed observer no longer provides
a reliable guide to decision-making on the issue of apparent bias.
No wonder their Lordships found themselves in some difficulty in
Abdroikov. We will now return to this case.
BACK TO ABDROIKOV
I will not say much about whether I consider the decision of the House
of Lords in Abdroikov to be the “right” one on the merits. Suffice it to
say here that I consider the approaches and decisions of the Court of
Appeal and the dissents of Lords Rodgers and Carswell to be more
supportable, and the majority’s approaches in the two appeals that
were allowed to be unfortunate. It follows that I also consider the
subsequent approach of the Court of Appeal to similar issues in R. v.
Bakish Alla Khan73 to be eminently sensible.
But the point of this article is not to analyse the merits of the actual
decisions in Abdroikov. It is rather to spotlight the role of the impartial
70 The Lord Justice-General in Transco Plc v. HM Advocate [2005] ScotHC HCJAC1 at [22]; Lord
Hope of Craighead said in Davidson v. Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 at [47].
71 Hauschildt v. Denmark (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 266, 279, at [48]; Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2007) 44
E.H.R.R. 27, [2005] ECHR 873 at [118].
72 Lord Bingham in Abdroikov at [16].
73 [2008] EWCA Crim 531 – Lord Philips of Worth Matravers C.J., Sir Igor Judge P, and Silber J.
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observer. It is clear that courts often face difficulties when they intro-
duce fictional characters into the law. While such constructs can be
helpful in the quest for a broad, organising principle, they can, if taken
too far, create problems. The facts of the three appeals in Abdroikov
were straightforward, and the applicable legal principles were suppos-
edly clear. The judges did not disagree as to the facts, and they did not
disagree as to the law. Yet, in applying accepted facts to accepted
principles of apparent bias, the outcome was an almost even split (3/5
overall) between senior judges (Court of Appeal and House of Lords).
The arguments supporting these different decisions are all reasonable,
and, sometimes, compelling, as one would expect of the rationalisa-
tions of senior judges. Such splits would be understandable, and, in-
deed, almost inevitable, if the issue were novel, the facts disputed, or
the law unclear. But this was not the case here. The decision has re-
sulted in at least one attempt to seek amendments to the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, which, pursuant to the Auld Report, removed the old
disqualifications against, inter alia, the classes of juror under scrutiny
in these cases.74
That some of the major gains achieved by the Auld Report and the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 by opening up jury service to all classes of
people, including prosecutors and judges, could so easily and quickly
be questioned is unfortunate. Worse still, the Abdroikov decision is not
particularly helpful to the lower courts. In R. v. Bakish Alla Khan75,
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers C.J., for the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division), admitted that the Court had “not found it easy to
deduce on the part of the majority of the Committee [in Abdroikov]
clear principles that apply where a juror is a police officer.” He pro-
vided examples of the lack of clarity, one of which was that:
Of the three who found apparent bias on the facts of the first
appeal, Lord Bingham did so on the basis that the police juror
would appear partial to the police witness, whose evidence in-
volved a ‘crucial dispute’ with that of the appellant. The apparent
likelihood that he would prefer the evidence of a ‘brother officer’
would be seen as ‘a real and possible source of unfairness’, so that
the jury was not a tribunal which was and appeared to be
impartial … It is not entirely clear that Lord Bingham concluded
that the police juror had the appearance of being partial to the
prosecution, as opposed to simply being biased in respect of
the relevant conflict of evidence and, indeed, it is probably not
74 Douglas Hogg, Early Day Motion 160 (8 November 2007), “That this House notes the decision of
the House of Lords in the cases of R. v Abdroikov, R. v Green and R. v Williamson; and believes
that the law should be amended so as to exclude police officers and prosecutors employed by the
Crown Prosecution Service from serving on a jury.”
75 [2008] EWCA Crim 531 at [24].
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possible to draw a clear line between the two on the facts of the
case.76
This is a poor reflection on the state of the law. The culprit is partly the
informed observer – or, more correctly, the courts’ preoccupation with
the informed observer.
Part of the aftermath of Abdroikov was the Court of Appeal feeling
compelled in R. v. Bakish Alla Khan to do something about the situ-
ation. Khan involved a number of appeals on the grounds of jury bias,
where the relevant jurors were either police officers, prison officers, or
CPS employees. Lord Phillips C.J. felt it undesirable that apprehen-
sions of jury bias should lead to the kinds of appeals that the Court was
facing in that case.77 He thought it “particularly undesirable” for such
appeals to result in the quashing of convictions requiring retrials. Thus,
it was important that any risk of jury bias, or of unfairness as a result of
partiality to witnesses should be identified before the trial begins, and,
if such a risk may arise, then the juror should be stood down.78 His last
statements in the judgment are instructive:
We considered attempting to give guidance in this judgment as to
the steps that should be taken to ensure that the risk of jury bias
does not occur. However, it seems to us that these will involve
instructions to be given by the police, prosecuting and prison
authorities to their employees coupled with guidance to court of-
ficials. It would be ambitious to attempt to formulate all of this in
a judgment without discussion with those involved. There is one
matter, however, that should receive attention without any delay.
It is essential that the trial judge should be aware at the stage of
jury selection if any juror in waiting is or has been, a police officer
or a member of the prosecuting authority, or is a serving prison
officer. Those called for jury service should be required to record
on the appropriate form whether they fall into any of these
categories, so that this information can be conveyed to the judge.
We invite all of these authorities and Her Majesty’s Court Service
to consider the implications of this judgment and to issue such
directions as they consider appropriate.79
THE INFORMED OBSERVER REVISITED
As mentioned earlier, Lord Mance noted in Abdroikov that the division
of opinion with regard to two of the appeals in that case turned largely
on “different perceptions of the view that would be taken by a fair-
minded and informed observer, after considering the facts”, of the
76 At [25] and [26].
77 At [131].
78 Ibid.
79 At [132].
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question whether there was a reasonable possibility of bias.80 I will now
return to this point.
Lord Goff of Chieveley had dealt with the issue of whose viewpoint
should be considered in R. v. Gough.81 After a review of the existing case
law, Lord Goff compared the approaches of Devlin L.J. in R. v.
Barnsley Licensing Justices Ex p Barnsley and District Licensed
Victuallers Association,82 and Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan
Properties Ltd v. Lannon.83 According to Lord Goff, both considered
that proof of actual bias was not necessary, that the court had to pro-
ceed “upon an impression derived from the circumstances”; and that
the question is “whether such an impression reveals a real likelihood of
bias”.84 He found that the point where Lord Denning M.R. and Devlin
L.J. differed was that, while Devlin L.J. was concerned with the im-
pression that the court gets from the circumstances, Lord Denning
M.R. “looked at the circumstances from the point of view of a
reasonable man.” Lord Goff was able to reconcile the apparent dif-
ferences, saying:
Since however the court investigates the actual circumstances,
knowledge of such circumstances as are found by the court must
be imputed to the reasonable man; and in the result it is difficult to
see what difference there is between the impression derived by a
reasonable man to whom such knowledge has been imputed, and
the impression derived by the court, here personifying the reason-
able man.85
Lord Goff returned to this theme shortly afterwards, in these terms:
… I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to
require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of
a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these per-
sonifies the reasonable man; and in any event the court has first to
ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evidence,
knowledge of which would not necessarily be available to an ob-
server in court at the relevant time.86
Lord Goff was simply being frank about what really goes on in this
kind of case – i.e., that the court is making its own evaluation of the
factual circumstances in arriving at a decision. But the courts have
since sought to distance themselves from Lord Goff, a matter discussed
in more detail below. And so, we have a plethora of cases involving
judges expressing opinions on what a fair-minded and impartial
80 At [80].
81 [1993] A.C. 646 at 667–670.
82 [1967] 2 Q.B. 167.
83 [1969] 1 Q.B. 577.
84 [1993] A.C. 646, at 667.
85 At 667–668.
86 At 670.
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observer would (or would not) think or conclude.87 This would be
perfectly fine, had the impartial observer being referred to (and there
is nothing that renders this approach incompatible with Strasbourg
jurisprudence) been the reviewing court itself. But this is not the case,88
and, unfortunately, this approach unravelled in Abdroikov wherein so
many senior judges came to different and incompatible views of what
the informed observer would think.
Abdroikov demonstrates that some of the developments following
R. v Gough have not advanced the situation very much (if at all) and
that the attempted departures from Lord Goff’s statements in R. v
Gough have been futile, and, in retrospect, possibly misguided.
The High Court of Australia has rightly warned that the interpo-
sition of the fictional informed observer should not be taken too far,89
and that “it is important to reserve to the appellate court a capacity to
review the facts and the complaints having regard to the ‘serious and
sensitive issues’ raised by an allegation of prejudgment”. The Court of
Appeal of Northern Ireland similarly warned in Re Purcell’s appli-
cation:
These anthropomorphic creations of the common law lend a hu-
manising and homely touch to the law, personalising what are, in
effect, objective tests of fairness and rationality. The metaphors
should not distract from a proper understanding of the objective
nature of the question which has to be addressed in individual
cases. The critical issue in the present case is whether it would be
fair and reasonable in the circumstances to conclude that there is a
real possibility that the relevant decision makers, the members of
the disciplinary panel, would not evaluate objectively and impar-
tially the evidence and material which they had to consider in
carrying out the task assigned to them … 90
Richards J. (as he then was) has remarked that the test must be ap-
proached “with appropriate caution”91 – a warning that was used to
great effect by Jackson J. to reconcile two apparently conflicting lines
of authority in R. (on the Application of Lewis) v. Redcar and Cleveland
87 For examples of recent relevant decisions of the higher courts, see R. v. Wilson [2008] EWCA Crim
134; R. v. S [2008] EWCA Crim 138; R. v. Pintori [2007] EWCA Crim 1700; Gillies v. Secretary of
State for Work and Pensions, [2006] UKHL 2, 2006 S.C. 71 (H.L.); R. v. Karl Eldin, Bakri Siraj-
Eldin [2006] EWCA Crim 1904; Helow v. Advocate General, 2007 S.C. 303; R. v. Marquez-Arnedo
(Nicholas) [2006] EWCA Crim 1988; R. v. Campbell [2005] EWCA Crim 248; Man O’War Station
Ltd v. Auckland City Council (No.1) [2002] UKPC 28.
88 As Lord Steyn for the Privy Council pointed out in Man O’War Station Ltd v. Auckland City
Council (No.1) [2002] UKPC 28 at [10] the adjusted test in Porter v. Magill emphasises the
perspective of the fair-minded observer rather than the view of the court.
89 Kirby J. in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] HCA 48 at [48].
90 [2008] NICA 11 at [26] – per Girvan L.J.
91 Georgiou v. Enfield London Borough Council [2004] EWHC 779 (Admin) at [31].
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Borough Council.92 It has also been said that the question must be ap-
proached “realistically”.93
These are pertinent points – already alluded to by Lord Mance in
Abdroikov itself. He noted94 that the decisions of In re Medicaments and
Related Classes of Goods (No. 2)95 and Porter v. Magill96 replaced the
court, whose view had previously been taken as the relevant test in R. v.
Gough, with “the fair-minded and informed observer – a reasonable
member of the public …” He also noted the difficulties inherent in this
shift – something that he was well placed to observe, having already
seen drafts of all the other speeches before writing his own:
But the fair-minded and informed observer is him or herself in
large measure the construct of the court. Individual members of
the public, all of whom might claim this description, have widely
differing characteristics, experience, attitudes and beliefs which
could shape their answers on issues such as those before the court,
without their being easily cast as unreasonable. The differences of
view in the present case illustrate the difficulties of attributing to
the fair-minded and informed observer the appropriate balance
between on the one hand complacency and naivety and on the
other cynicism and suspicion.97
WHAT DOES THE INFORMED OBSERVER KNOW?
The “difficulties” referred to by Lord Mance in Abdroikov are inherent
in any endeavour to construct a fictional character, since the attributes
to be assigned to the character inevitably become controversial. We
have already seen above the unrealistic attributes that the informed
observer is supposed to possess. Unfortunately, the problem of as-
signing the “right” personality attributes is just one side of the coin.
The other side of the coin is the problem of how to ensure that, this
person, having been assigned the “right” personality, is also appropri-
ately “informed”. This, as one might expect, has also presented the
courts with difficulties – which are well illustrated in Re Purcell’s ap-
plication.98 Kerr L.C.J. said, in response to counsel’s argument that
“if the observer is endowed with a surfeit of information, his or her
detached status would be compromised and the essential component of
public confidence would be imperilled”:
One can understand that it is necessary that the objectivity of the
notional observer should not be compromised by being drawn too
92 [2007] EWHC 3166 (Admin).
93 Scott Baker L.J. in R. v. K [2007] EWCA Crim 1620, at [24].
94 At [80]–[81].
95 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 700.
96 [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 A.C. 357.
97 At [81].
98 [2008] NICA 11.
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deeply into a familiarity with the procedures, if that would make
him or her too ready to overlook an appearance of bias, but we do
not consider that either Lord Hope or Baroness Hale [in Gillies v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ([2006] UKHL 2)] was
suggesting that the amount of information available to the ob-
server should necessarily be restricted to that which was instantly
available to a member of the public. The phrase ‘capable of being
known’ from Lord Hope’s formulation holds the key, in our opi-
nion. This does not signify a need to restrict the material to that
which is immediately in the public domain but includes such in-
formation as may be necessary for an informed member of the
public without any particular, specialised knowledge or experience
to make a dispassionate judgment.99
He concluded that “it would be necessary for the informed observer to
be aware of the general structure of the system of disciplinary panels, to
be conscious that this is a procedure internal to the police force and
that the Chief Constable is statutorily authorised to appoint members
of panels while retaining an interest in the outcome of disciplinary
hearings.”100 Similarly, in Re Young’s application,101 Kerr L.C.J. said, in
the circumstances of that case, that it was “relevant for the informed
observer … to take into account the administrative arrangements that
underlie the decision and the statutory requirements, if any, as to how
it should be reached”. In Sengupta & Anor v. Holmes & Ors,102 Laws
L.J. said that the observer “would know of the central place accorded
to oral argument in our common law adversarial system.” In Feld v.
London Borough of Barnet,103 Ward L.J. said:
[I]n judging whether that is a real as opposed to a fanciful risk the
informed observer will bear in mind that this is an administrative
decision which by the will of Parliament is placed in the hands of a
senior officer of the local housing authority who has been trained
to the task and brings expert knowledge and experience of the
local housing authority’s work to bear on the decision making
process.104
Other things which the informed observer would bear in mind, ac-
cording to Ward L.J., are, that judges do sit on matters which they have
dealt with on previous occasions, that deference must be given to the
will of Parliament,105 and the practical realities of decision making in
the local housing authority’s department.106 In Re Bothwell’s application
99 At [20].
100 At [21].
101 [2007] NICA 32, at [8].
102 [2002] EWCA Civ 1104 at [38].
103 [2004] EWCA Civ 1307.
104 At [44].
105 Ibid.
106 At [45].
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(No 2),107 Weatherup J. felt that the informed observer would note “the
specialist nature” of the Tuberculosis and Brucellosis Valuation Appeals
Panel and the appointment of a specialist from the Department of
Agriculture and Regional Development (DARD) “to reflect the need
for such expertise to contribute to decision making, the separation of
powers within the Department so that the DARD member is appointed
from a different stream to those engaged in processing claims and the
non involvement of the DARD member with any aspect of the matters
giving rise to the claim, which matters would of themselves not indicate
any real possibility of bias or legitimate doubt.” In Bolkiah & Ors v.
The State of Brunei Darussalam & Anor (Brunei Darussalam) Lord
Bingham attributed the following knowledge to the informed observer:
[The observer must] be taken to understand that the Chief Justice
[of Brunei] was a judge of unblemished reputation, nearing the end
of a long and distinguished judicial career in more than one juris-
diction, sworn to do right to all manner of people without fear or
favour, affection or ill-will and already enjoying what he described
as “reasonably adequate” pension provision. Such an observer
would dismiss as fanciful the notion that such a judge would break
his judicial oath and jeopardise his reputation in order to curry
favour with the Sultan and secure a relatively brief extension of his
contract, or to avoid a reduction of his salary which has never (so
far as the Board is aware) been made in the case of any Brunei
judge at any time. The Chief Justice must be seen as a man for
whom all ambition was spent, save that of retiring with the highest
judicial reputation.108
In El-Farargy v. El Farargy & Ors109 Ward L.J. thought that a fair-
minded observer would know that judges are trained to have an open
mind and that judges frequently do change their minds during the
course of any hearing.110 And, according to the Lord Justice-Clerk
(Gill) in Robertson v. HM Advocate111, the observer would also “be
aware of the traditions of judicial integrity and of the judicial oath”,
and “would give it great weight”.112 He or she would “recognise the
desirability of a judge’s keeping in touch with the world beyond the
courts, and that his or her personal interests and experience may lead
to membership of or involvement with external organisations.”113 The
observer must also be taken to be aware of the statutory functions of
the clerk of a district court, and of the relationship between the clerk
107 [2007] NIQB 25 at [19].
108 [2007] UKPC 62 at [21].
109 [2007] EWCA Civ 1149 at [26].
110 Compare Laws L.J. in Sengupta & Anor v. Holmes & Ors [2002] EWCA Civ 1104 at [38].
111 [2007] HC.J.AC 63; 2007 SLT 1153 at [63].
112 Per Lord Nimmo Smith in Helow v. Advocate General [2007] SC 303 at [35].
113 Lord Nimmo Smith, ibid.
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and the court.114 Finally, in R. (on the Application of Lewis) v. Redcar
and Cleveland Borough Council Jackson J. said:
In the context of decisions reached by a council committee, the
notional observer is a person cognisant of the practicalities of local
government. He does not take it amiss that councillors have pre-
viously expressed views on matters which arise for decision. In the
ordinary run of events, he trusts councillors, whatever their pre-
existing views, to approach decision making with an open mind. If,
however, there are additional and unusual circumstances which
suggest that councillors may have closed their minds before em-
barking upon a decision, then he will conclude that there is a real
possibility of bias or predetermination.115
It is possible to cite more examples, but the point is hopefully
already obvious. The clear trend in the cases has been that, as the
complexities of the factual situations or the “grey areas” increase, the
informed observer is imbued with increased knowledge and under-
standing in order for the courts to be able to arrive at the right out-
come. This is inconsistent with the rationales for interposing a lay
person, for, in the end, the courts will attribute to the informed ob-
server all the knowledge which they consider necessary in order for
them to reach the right decision. In fact, if one were to attempt to
articulate the knowledge and experience of judges, one could do no
better than what we have just seen being attributed to the impartial
observer. As such, this impartial observer might as well be a judge.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH GOUGH?
Lord Goff posited in R. v. Gough116 that the reviewing court could
personify the reasonable man. This has proved controversial, as the
courts have been concerned to ensure that they are not seen to be
holding a mirror onto themselves.117 Ostensibly, this shyness on the part
of the courts is to promote public confidence in the administration of
justice. For example, according to Baroness Hale of Richmond in
Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions:
The ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ is probably not an in-
sider (i.e. another member of the same tribunal system). Otherwise
she would run the risk of having the insider’s blindness to the
faults that outsiders can so easily see.118
114 Lord Nimmo Smith in Robbie the Pict v. Wylie [2007] HCJAC 10 at [21].
115 [2007] EWHC 3166 (Admin) at [76].
116 [1993] A.C. 646.
117 See for example Sedley J. in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex parte Kirkstall Valley
Campaign Ltd [1996] 3 All E.R. 304 at 316.
118 [2006] UKHL 2 at [39].
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Kerr L.C.J., referring to this passage in Re Purcell’s application,119 said
that “[o]ne needs to be alert to the danger of transforming the observer
from his or her essential condition of disinterested yet informed neu-
trality to that of someone who, by dint of his or her engagement in the
system that has generated the challenge, has acquired something of an
insider’s status.”
The principle of “real danger” of bias propounded in R. v. Gough120
was abandoned following some critical comments on it. In R. v. Inner
West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio121 Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.
took the view that the preference in Gough for the real danger of bias
test, as opposed to a test whether a reasonable and fair-minded person
sitting in court and having all the necessary information would have a
reasonable suspicion of bias indicated that Lord Hewart C.J.’s dictum
in the Sussex Justices case that justice should be seen to be done may no
longer be good law, except “where the appearance of bias is such as to
show a real danger of bias”.122
In R. v. Webb,123 Mason C.J. and McHugh J. also criticised the
Gough test. In their judgment they noted the fact “that the appearance
as well as the fact of impartiality is necessary to retain confidence in the
administration of justice”124 and that the parties and the general public
must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has been
seen to be done. In their view, “the reasonable apprehension test of bias
is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of impar-
tiality”, while the tests of reasonable likelihood or real danger of bias
tend to emphasise the court’s view of the facts, leading to a situation
wherein “the trial judge’s acceptance of explanations becomes of pri-
mary importance”. In their view, these two tests “tend to place inad-
equate emphasis on the public perception of the irregular incident”.125
Continuing with their criticism, they said:
In Gough, the House of Lords rejected the need to take account of
the public perception of an incident which raises an issue of bias
except in the case of a pecuniary interest. Behind this reasoning
is the assumption that public confidence in the administration of
justice will be maintained because the public will accept the con-
clusions of the judge. But the premise on which the decisions in
this Court are based is that public confidence in the administration
of justice is more likely to be maintained if the Court adopts a
119 [2008] NICA 11 at [19].
120 [1993] A.C. 646.
121 [1994] 4 All E.R. 139.
122 At 162.
123 [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 C.L.R. 41.
124 At [9].
125 Ibid.
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test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member
of the public to the irregularity in question.126
They then referred to a number of Australian authorities, which, in
their view, “indicate that it is the court’s view of the public’s view, not
the court’s own view, which is determinative.” They concluded that, “if
public confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained,
the approach that is taken by fair-minded and informed members of
the public cannot be ignored.”
While this is a fair point, the courts are arguably not very good at
doing this kind of task,127 and “the court’s view of the public’s view” is
inevitably the judges’ own views of the matter. The foregoing analysis
has, it is submitted, revealed that much. Hiding it behind the cloak of
their “view of the public’s view” has not been very convincing, and
attributing every kind of knowledge to the fictional creature that is
meant to represent “the public” is even less convincing.
Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. was referring in his statement concern-
ing Gough in R. v. Inner West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio more
to the substance of the Gough test (i.e., “real danger”, as opposed to
“reasonable suspicion”) than to the question whether the reviewing
court should be making an assessment of the possibilities of bias from
its own perspective, or from the perspective of a fictitious bystander
distinct from the court. As long as the matter is about appearances
from the perspective of an independent third party, and the court is to
make the final judgement on the matter, it makes no difference whether
or not a fiction is employed.
Choosing the perspective of a lay person rather than that of the
reviewing court might look attractive from the points of view of the
avoidance of excessive legalism and of engendering public confidence
on a matter in which the public may be suspicious – judges judging
judges. However, having seen the kinds of knowledge routinely attrib-
uted to the fictitious lay person, it is obvious that the courts are quite
unable to resolve convincingly the question of how this matter would
appear to a lay person. The best way to ensure that such a fiction
becomes reality is to empanel lay juries in bias cases, hence leaving
the question of how the matter would appear to a lay person to real
lay persons. Unless that is done, then the courts might as well assume
the position of the impartial observer. This would not require any
126 At [10].
127 See generally, J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th edn. (London 1997). Compare S.
Atrill, “Who is the ‘Fair-Minded and Informed Observer’? Bias after Magill ”, [2003] C.L.J. 279 at
281, suggesting that the difficulties faced by the courts in these cases “may reflect a concern that
the judiciary, belonging to a relatively homogeneous social group, is not best placed to develop an
accurate picture of a hypothetical person.”
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significant change to the current principle. It would only involve dis-
pensing with a fictional and theoretical “middle-man”.
CONCLUSION: AWAY WITH THE LAY INFORMED OBSERVER
Perhaps the time has come for the “informed observer”, to the extent
that this is meant to be an ordinary lay member of the public, to be
retired. The persona given to this phantom ensures that it will always
remain elusive. Its capacity to increase in wisdom, knowledge and
understanding, as any particular case may require, is not credible. It is
clear that no human being could live up to its reputation, and that,
judges, being mere mortals, do not have any chance of deciphering (or
agreeing on) what this creature would or could think. This construct no
longer serves any useful purpose.
The reasons for wanting to replace the evaluations of judges with
the perspective of an ordinary lay member of the public are laudable.
However, the task assigned to the observer, when all its parameters are
fully engaged, is beyond the ken of an ordinary lay member of the
public. The task was expressed succinctly by Kerr L.C.J. in Re Purcell’s
application:
The concept of apparent bias does not rest on impression based on
an incomplete picture but on a fair and reasoned judgment formed
as a result of composed and considered appraisal of the relevant
facts.128
This is a straightforward description of what judges do on a day-to-day
basis. The task is, in essence, a normal judicial function. This is the
reason why the courts have been at pains (incrementally) to attach
increasingly unrealistic and unachievable attributes to the unfortunate
lay person to whom they have endeavoured, for all the noblest reasons,
to hive off the task. The difficulties experienced by the courts in con-
structing the informed lay observer require that this construct either be
thought through in order to provide a realistic basis for decision-
making on the issue of apparent bias, or be killed off and buried.
There are a number of possible responses to the resolution of these
difficulties. One is to call for a more flexible approach to the appli-
cation of the informed observer principle.129 Another is to dispense with
the need for the informed observer to be “informed”, which then means
that the courts can avoid expending energy on the kinds of knowledge
that he or she should have in order to be “informed”. A third is to
empanel lay juries in all cases of apparent bias, so that the courts can
secure the actual views of the ordinary members of the public, as it
128 [2008] NICA 11 at [22].
129 See S. Atrill, “Who is the ‘Fair-Minded and Informed Observer’?” [2003] C.L.J. 279.
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were, from the horse’s mouth. A fourth is to dispense with the whole
notion of an observer outwith the courts and to use the perspective of
the reviewing court.
The first two responses retain the construct and seek to modify the
courts’ approach thereto. The problem is that, whatever their intrinsic
strengths and weaknesses, they might just be plastering over the
cracks of a flawed construct. My point is that the construct itself is
the problem. The third response is the only convincing approach to
implementing the principle that the observer must be an ordinary
member of the public. It would suffer from the difficulties of practic-
ability, affordability, and the obvious fact that ordinary members of the
public are a very diverse group whose views in any random selection
are unpredictable.
As already indicated, my view is that the problem is with the con-
struct itself. At the end of the day, human judges are going to have to
make a decision about this construct’s state of mind. Judges are ex-
perienced and well trained to evaluate facts and to draw inferences
from those facts. There is no need to hide such activities behind an
artificial construct. The goal at all times is to ensure that justice is done,
and is seen to be done. Judges are as capable as anyone else to secure
this outcome, and are far better placed to do so than any ordinary lay
member of the public. As Mummery L.J. rightly said in AWG Group
Ltd v. Morrison,130 “an appellate court is well able to assume the van-
tage point of a fair-minded and informed observer with knowledge of
the relevant circumstances.” He then went on to say that the appellate
court “must itself make an assessment of all the relevant circumstances
and then decide whether there is a real possibility of bias.” The next
logical step is what he did not say – that the appellate court, consisting
of fair-minded and informed observers with knowledge of the relevant
circumstances, must draw its conclusions, not by reference to what
another fictitious fair-minded and informed observer with knowledge
of the relevant circumstances would conclude, but by reference to what
itself as an embodiment of fair-mindedness and relevant knowledge
had concluded.
This, it is submitted, would advance matters significantly and would
simplify the process of deciding cases of apparent bias. Thus, instead of
counsel expending much time and energy arguing about what an in-
formed observer “would” take into account,131 they would simply
present their submissions to the court. And instead of judges embark-
ing on the dubious journey of probing into the mind of a fictitious lay
person, they would simply indicate which submissions they found more
130 [2006] EWCA Civ 6 at [20]. Applied in Howell v. Lees Millais [2007] EWCA Civ 720.
131 See for example, Re Purcell’s application [2008] NICA 11, at [16]; R. (On the Application of Abdi)
v. Lambeth LBC [2007] EWHC 1565 (Admin) at [34].
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convincing, and why. The reviewing court would need to be mindful of
the need to be alert to the possibility of being blind to the defects in the
judicial process. And I think judges are well able, with the assistance of
counsel, to identify and evaluate all that needs to be taken into account.
All this is just another way of saying that matters ought to be re-
turned to what was stated by Lord Goff in R. v. Gough:
I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to re-
quire that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a
reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these per-
sonifies the reasonable man; and in any event the court has first to
ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evi-
dence … 132
What this means in bias cases is accepting that judicial evaluations of
the circumstances will often come down eventually to the value judg-
ments of individual judges. This is already the fact, no matter the the-
ory – something that Abdroikov has again exposed. Such an approach
is not likely to lead to significant differences in outcomes133 – but it
would avoid much time and effort being wasted in fruitless debates
about what a fictitious lay person would think. Matters would return to
the simplicity of judges expressing their conclusions based on their own
assessment of the facts – a refreshing position exemplified by this ap-
proach of Nelson J. in R. v. Alan I:
In these circumstances, we have no doubt that there was here a real
possibility of bias arising from the presence on the jury of a police
officer who knew the police witnesses. The possibility that he
might be likely to accept the words of his colleagues, irrespective
of the dispute between the parties is one which can only be de-
scribed as real. We know no more than that and there is no
suggestion the police officer was actually biased. None at all.
Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. We fear
that on the facts of this case that did not occur.134
Echoing Girvan L.J. in Re Purcell’s application,135 the “critical issue”
for the reviewing judges would be “whether it would be fair and
reasonable in the circumstances to conclude that there is a real possi-
bility that the relevant decision makers … would not evaluate objec-
tively and impartially the evidence and material which they had to
consider in carrying out the task assigned to them”.
132 [1993] A.C. 646 at 670.
133 Indeed, Lord Steyn said in Man O’War Station Ltd v. Auckland City Council (No.1) [2002] UKPC
28 at [10] that “In any event, the distinction [between the court and the lay observer] is a fine one,
notably since even on the Gough test the court undoubtedly had to take account of public
perception and confidence.”
134 [2007] EWCA Crim 2999 at [33].
135 [2008] NICA 11 at [26].
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